In this paper we have updated Central Bank Transparency Index from 2011 to 2016, following the methodology of Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) [1] . Then, we break down the index's aspects and we analyze which are more likely to be changed through time. This, in respect to the annual data we have collected, makes clearer how the recent financial crisis has affected the Central Banks' transparency trend and offers interesting insights for monetary policy transmission. Also, we divided the countries into developed, emerging and frontiers, as there is difference in their indexes changes, probably related to their economic and financial development.
Introduction
The new paradigm in monetary policy is that Central Banks have to be transparent as well as independent. The communication of monetary policy actions and projections about important macroeconomic and financial variables to the public is crucial for the effectiveness of monetary policy. There is an important strand of the literature highlighting the beneficial effects of increased transparency on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to the real economy [2] [3] . Additionally, the benefit of Central Bank transparency on macroeconomic and financial outcomes is also highlighted by the existing literature [4] - [11] .
The objective of this study is twofold: Firstly, we update the index of Central An important result of the crisis is the recessionary effects for the economies.
However, Central Banks that might have multiple objectives could probably de- cide to embrace secrecy in order to obtain better results in terms of lower unemployment. On the other hand, more opaque monetary policies may negatively affect the credibility of Central Banks, with severe consequences for the effectiveness of monetary policies. Moreover, there is always enough space to improve transparency, especially for emerging and frontier economies that exhibit relatively low levels of transparency. In such a context, the investigation of the evolution of transparency as a whole as well as the progress of each aspect is of outmost interest.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology employed to update the index of transparency. In Section 3 we present the index of transparency for the period of investigation. In Section 4, we present separately each aspect of transparency while highlighting the trend. We conclude in the last section.
Methodology
The transparency index is based on the methodology developed by Eijffinger and 
Central Bank Transparency Index
In Table 1 As we can presume from Figure 1 there is a trend of increase in Central Bank transparency, which has also been indicated by Dincer and Eichengreen [17] . On average, the transparency levels of developed countries rose from 11.14 to 11.57 during the investigated period, while emerging countries' transparency slightly 
The Evolution of Different Aspects of Central Bank Transparency
According to the terminology of Geraats [4] , there are five aspects of central bank transparency, namely political, economic, procedural, policy and operational.
The political aspect of the transparency index refers to the independence between the Central Banks' administrative council and the Government and whether are there primary objectives of the monetary policy and if they are quantified (see Table 2 ). The economic aspect of transparency, presented in Table 3 , refers to the disclosure of main economic data, such as GDP, CPI, Money Supply, Employment or Unemployment and Capacity Utilization, the forecasts of the main variables (GDP and CPI) and whether the Central Bank discloses or not the macroeconomic models it uses. The vast majority of Central Banks publish two to four variables. Most of developed countries' Central Banks publish 4 variables (not Capacity Utilization), while Japan, Iceland and Sweden publish all data mentioned before. Central Banks in frontier countries are more transparent than emerging also at this aspect. Most Central Banks report 3 -4 variables value at least quarterly and forecasts for GDP and CPI at least annually. Central Banks in emerging countries are less transparent usually publishing 2 -3 variables quarterly and at least annual reports of CPI and GDP expectations, while not disclosing macroeconomic models.
This aspect has the most upward course through time for all 3 categories (see Figure 3 ). The possible reason for this is that the inflation targeting policy of most Central Banks leads to Inflation Forecasts publishing at least quarterly while being more transparent. Also, inflation targeting leads to adoption of macroeconomic models or model development.
In Table 4 we present the procedural aspect of transparency, which refers to whether the bank releases the framework under which decisions were made, including minutes of explanations, the monetary policy framework and voting records.
Central Banks in developed countries publish minutes of explanations and the framework under which decisions were made. Some of them also publish the voting records from monetary policy committee meetings, and so they reach a 2 to 2.5 with the most transparent central banks having a 2.5 to 3, as the UK, the USA, Norway, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand and Sweden. Central Banks in emerging countries usually publish some explanations and the framework but Malaysia  2  2  2  2  2  2   Philippines  2  2  2  2  2  2   Thailand  2  2  2  2  2  2   Saudi Arabia  0  0  0  0  0  0   Turkey  2  2  2  2  2  2   Hungary  3  3  3  3  3  3   Russia  2  2  2  2 forward-looking assessment and probable future actions is presented in Table   5 .
Almost in all developed countries, Central Banks make predictions about the actions they imply, propose solutions in case of not meeting the targets and almost extensively analyze their policy inclination after every meeting, while publishing them almost immediately after every policy meeting. As it can be seen from Figure 5 , there was no increase during the period we studied for the de- Table 6 .
The high level of transparency in its operational aspect was reached in developed countries due to the necessity for explanations over the macroeconomic disturbances caused by the financial crisis. Central Banks in most developed countries had chosen to publish almost all data to which operational aspect refers. On the other hand, Central Banks in most emerging countries publish only short term forecasts about the policy's transmission process and a superficial evaluation of the policy's outcome in light of its macroeconomic objectives, but no explanations about achieved targets. For Central Banks in the frontier countries, their publishing policy significantly differs from country to country. For example, some of them prefer to publish full data about their control over the main operating instruments, but no forecasts for macroeconomic disturbances or evaluation of the policy meeting the target. Others prefer to publish short-term forecasts without giving explanations about their policy reaching the target. This aspect does not follow a common rule about data publication for the frontier countries. As it can be observed in Figure 6 , an increase in the operational aspect is present in 2016. 
Conclusion
In this study, we investigated the evolution of the transparency index over the period 2011-2016. By examining the transparency index of 34 economies, we observe that there is a positive trend in the progress of the index as a whole, which is mainly attributed to emerging and frontier economies' Central Banks.
We also notice that the economic aspect of transparency has improved the most.
This is due to an increase in the communication of projections about macroeconomic and financial variables by Central Banks, in their effort to anchor the private sector's inflation expectations. Overall, it seems that the upward trend in monetary policy transparency will continue in the future, because more and more Central Banks decide to pursue an explicit price-stability objective and recognize the importance of information disclosure for economic agents.
